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PREFACE 
This Discussion Paper presents some views on the 
relationship between the Acts under which the producer 
boards operate and the Commerce Act, 1986. In particular, 
the discussion reviews the interpretation of the powers 
contained in the Apple & Pear Marketing Act, 1948 in 
conjunction with the Commerce Act, 1986. While the Apple & 
Pear Marketing Act provides for monopsony power to be held 
by the N.Z. Apple & Pear Marketing Board, the Commerce Act 
provides for the promotion of "competition in markets in 
New Zealand" (Cooke, 1989). This apparent conflict has been 
addressed in a recent court action involving the N.Z. Apple 
& Pear Marketing Board and Apple Fields Ltd. 
This Discussion Paper presents an economic perspective of 
the case and its outcome and raises a number of questions 
which should be addressed. In particular, the ruling 
provides for the Apple & Pear Marketing Act to take priority 
over the more recent Commerce Act. Was this Parliament's 
intention? This case also raised the question of the 
appropriate representation for people and organisations 
involved in particular industries. While the democratic 
system entitles each participant to one vote, should there 
be some form of weighting where the participants are far 
from equal in their involvement in the industry, ego should 
the 10 hectare apple producer have the same "voting power" 
as a 10,000 hectare producer? A further question of 
importance is the relationship between existing industry 
participants and new entrants. While freedom of entry and 
exit is a basic economic principle necessary for 
maximisation of returns, there appear to be grounds for 
justifying some constraints on new entrants. However, such 
constraints would be unnecessary were a "free market" to 
operate in terms of grower rights associated with access to 
export channels. 
Such issues are raised in this Discussion Paper. Further 
examination and review of these points is clearly necessary. 
R L Sheppard 
Assistant Director 
(i) 

1. INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural marketing boards are important institutions in 
Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and many African countries. Most were established earlier 
this century as a counterbalance to the perceived market 
power of processing and exporting corporations and to 
provide a mechanism for the co-ordination of production by 
producers. Marketing boards have also been used extensively 
asa vehicle for administering government policies to 
agricultural producers. 
The Closer Economic Relations (CER) free trade agreement 
between Australia and New Zealand raises some interesting 
issues between marketing boards in each country. The new 
Commerce Act in New Zealand has pro-competitive elements 
which were modelled on the counterpart Australian Act. 
However, in Australia marketing boards are exempt from these 
provisions whereas in New Zealand they are not exempt. 
Potential trans-Tasman trade in products like dairy products 
and apples and pears accordingly involve some legal as well 
as ,economic concerns. 
Some aspects of the operations of marketing boards have been 
controversial in most countries because they are thought to 
involve social costs to the nation or even to the industry 
itself. The research work contained in Hoos (1979) and that 
of Martin and Zwart (1987), Seiper (1982), Barichello 
(1982), Veeman (1987), Forbes, Hughes and Warley (1982), 
Saint-Louis and Proulx (1987), Institute for Policy Studies 
(1988) and Treasury (1984) address these issues. 
However, there is a competing set of criticisms. Marketing 
Boards have come under scrutiny by the OECD and the GATT 
from time to time on the grounds that they are instruments 
of export subsidisation and therefore represent unfair 
international competition. On balance both positions 
mentioned above cannot be correct in the Paretian sense, so 
it i~ important to examine empirical information on the 
performance of marketing boards when such information 
becomes available. 
Recently in New Zealand, a series of court cases have 
provided some insights into the behaviour of a statutory 
marketing board, the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board (the Board) with respect to domestic market 
~perations. The cases involve an alleged conflict between 
l~gislation supporting the Board and the more general anti-
trust legislation, the Commerce Act. This paper documents 
the legal and economic issues involved and offers some 
suggestions on how the apparent conflicts might be resolved. 
(1 ) 
(2 ) 
2. STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
Apples are an important export crop in New Zealand and the 
industry has experienced a marked increase in the growth of 
output since 1983 (54 percent from 1983 to 1987). This rate 
of growth is expected .to continue for some years yet as new 
plantings grow to maturity. Since much of ·the growth in 
tree plantings has occurred in non-traditional areas like 
Canterbury and in new varieties that are fetching price 
premia on world markets, there have been two important 
effects. The capital requirements for storage facilities 
have increased rapidly but largely in the non-traditional 
growing areas. Furthermore, the profitability of apple 
production in traditional areas is significantly lower than 
for new growers in the non-traditional areas. 
The New Zealand apple industry is characterised by about 
1500 family organised smaller units and a small number of 
corporate organised large growers who are recent entrants to 
the industry. Apple production technology is generally more 
advanced for the latter group who tend to grow the higher 
valued varieties, though data is difficult to find on this 
point. This creates a tension between existing growers who 
benefit from policies which cross-subsidise the production 
of lower priced varieties of apples and growers of new high 
priced varieties who have received lower prices from the 
statutory authority and who thereby fund the crops' 
subsidies. 
The industry is strongly export oriented and is continually 
changing varieties to keep up with changing market 
preferences. Fifty five percent of fresh apples produced are 
exported, 10 percent are consumed domestically and the 
remainder are processed into juice and other products. New 
Zealand has about 5 percent of world trade in apples and 
there is no evidence that New Zealand is able to influence 
-=-- . the world pr1ce in the long run. This is not to argue, 
however, that quasi rents do not exist in the short run 
associated with particular new varieties in particular 
markets. 
3. THE ORGANISATION OF THE INDUSTRY 
The New Zealand Fruit Growers' Federation (Fruit-Fed) is a 
70 year old association of fruit producers including apple 
growers. It has a pip fruit section which holds regular 
regional meetings and is democratically dominated by the 
small growers. Attendances at regional and national meetings 
are high and debate between old and new growers is sometimes 
intense. 
Fruit-Fed has very close connections 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board. 
with the New Zealand 
.It recommends the 
( 3 ) 
appointment of six of the Board's members, the other two 
being government appointed to represent consumer interests. 
Under the Apple and Pear Marketing Act, 1948, the Board has 
monopsony powers over the acquisition of domestic supply 
and the terms of supply at the farm gate. Once apples pass 
into the Board's hands, it decides how and where to store 
the fruit. It is argued that this policy is necessary to 
support the exporting process. The Board also has (and 
exercises) monopoly export and import rights for apples. 
These grew out of the Government's practice of buying and 
disposing of the whole crop during the Second World War when 
exporting and some importing was seen as a Government 
wartime responsibility. The predecessor to the Board was the 
New Zealand Fruit Export Control Board established under a 
1926 Act of Parliament, (Richardson, p5). The industry 
therefore has a long history of regulation. 
Growers are subject to the legal obligation to sell all 
applies and pears grown for human consumption to the Board 
which on-sells them. Tight restrictions on growers' gate 
sales are enforced but they do not curtail an illegal market 
between some supermarkets and some growers. Figures on the 
black market are not available and the Board stopped 
publishing the number of prosecutions after they had started 
to increase. The source of profit in the black market is 
the avoidance of levies which the Board imposes on fruit. 
Since local consumption of pip fruit is less than ten 
percent of the crop, the black market is important more as 
an indicator of strain in the system than as an illegal 
outlet. 
4. LEGISLATION 
The Apple and Pear Marketing Act grants the Board powers to 
set prices to be paid to the growers of apples and pears. 
Those prices are required to be set in consultation with 
Fruit-Fed. Payouts to growers were based on a practice of 
averaging the prices received for different varieties so 
that producers of high priced fruit were subsidising 
orchards producing low priced fruit. There have been recent 
modifications to this practice. Until tax laws changed in 
1988 the Board also operated a price stabilization fund. 
The Board regulates the quantity of imports of foreign-grown 
apples. It may and does set quality standards and levies on 
fruit. Inspectors enforce various packing, timing and 
quality requirements. Levies are set by the Board after 
consultation with Fruit-Fed. It will be apparent that the 
apple and pear industries are subject to an unusual amount 
of regulation. A symbiotic relation exists between the 
grower organisation and the regulatory authority (Holland, 
p29). All of the practices described appear to be legal 
under the Apple and Pear Marketing Act. 
(4 ) 
The Commerce Act, 1986 can be seen as a part of an 
enthusiasm which existed in 1984/85 for the deregulation of 
the New Zealand economy, (Cooke, pp 17, 18). Its object is 
"to promote competition in markets within New Zealand." 
The act establishes a Commerce Commission which conducts 
investigations based on complaints to it of uncompetitive 
activities and it rules on those complaints. It holds 
hearings to permit or prohibit mergers which in its view 
affect the degree of competition. More specifically, 
practices which substantially lessen competition in general, 
or fix prices or restrict supply or abuse a dominant 
position in a market are outlawed under the act. 
"Competition" means "workable competition". The Act 
requires that a particular purpose must be established 
before some of its sections apply. Purpose, in the event, 
was to be important in the case under consideration. 
5. THE ISSUES 
Prior to 1984 the Board, from time to time, had received 
heavily subsidised loans from the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand and its profits were non-taxable. Both of those 
subsidies have been discontinued and the Board has had to 
replace those sources of funds. 
In the early 1980's as the need for new Board storage 
facilities increased, consideration was initiated on how to 
finance the required investment. In 1983 an additional levy 
of 50 cents per carton, on each annual increase in output 
was introduced. It was called the "Second Tier Levy" (2TL). 
The 2TL was increased in 1988 to $1.35 per carton. The 
Board claimed that the purpose was to raise capital to allow 
the Board to provide the coolstores which the new output 
would require. 
The longrun effect of the second tier levy may be gauged 
from its effect in 1988. The levy essentially shifts the 
supply curve for apples upwards and to the left by the 
interest cost (say 5 percent real) on the levy ($1.35 per 
carton) beyond the current level of output. That is, the 
supply steps at this point. If the long run supply 
elasticity is 2, the export function for increased output 
shifted leftward by 4 percent at each price (assuming the 
self sufficiency ratio is 2.0). 
Accordingly, the Board levy system is reducing NZ exports 
below that which a competitive domestic apple market would 
achieve. This reduces New Zealand's exports vis a vis her 
competitors (Chile, Argentina, Australia, South Africa, US, 
etc) . The levy system of the Board does not enhance 
competiveness internationally as critics sometimes claim 
marketing boards do. 
(5) 
In 1988, the Board then proposed to introduce a 
"Transferable Crop Certificate" (TCC) scheme with the 
ostensible purposes of providing existing growers with an 
asset which would give them "an identifiable interest in the 
Board", and to finance the expansion of the Board's 
facilities in the face of rapidly rising output. ~hi~ 
s~heme would replace the second t~er levy. A grower was to 
be required to hold one TCC for each carton of fruit. Each 
TCC could be used again in subsequent years. Existing 
growers would be issued them free of charge, one for each 
carton of fruit produced on an average of past seasons' 
output. The TCC's could be sold and new growers would 
obtain their TCC's either on the open market or from the 
Board at a pre- announced price. The Board's argument was 
that by selling TCC's a retiring grower received a capital 
sum which was compensation for a portion of the Board's 
assets built up in the past from levies or otherwise lower 
payouts on the grower's fruit. Similarly, new growers 
purchasing TCC's would pay for the use of the facilities of 
the Board which their fruit would require and the Board if 
it was the seller would obtain a part of this finance to 
expand those facilities, principally coolstores. The Board 
had received legal advice (from Buddle Findlay) that the 
Apple and Pear Marketing Act permitted the operation of the 
TCC scheme. 
6. THE CASE 
Apple Fields Ltd, one of the large new corporate growers, 
brought an action in the High Court in 1989 against the 
Board and Fruit-Fed claiming that the TCC proposal was in 
breach of various sections of the Commerce Act. Dr Young, 
appearing for Apple Fields, used some strictly legal 
arguments but the main thrust of his case was based upon an 
economic analysis that the TCC's would substantially lessen 
competition, that they would be discriminatory against new 
growers in their application and that their introduction 
would be an abuse of a dominant position in the apple market 
by the Board and by Fruit-Fed. These issues are at the 
heart of the Commerce Act and Court's decision helps to 
define the interpretation of the act. 
The Board argued that the market of relevance to the case 
was the market for all types of fruit in which it had little 
monopolistic power (Bollard, para 57). It was further 
claimed that in a functional sense, because of the legal 
restrictions of the Apple and Pear Marketing Act, there was 
no market for apples in New Zealand since the Board was the 
agent of the growers (Bollard, para 62). The Commerce Act 
Section 3 states that the market is to be defined "as a 
matter of commercial sense" and" the Court agreed with Apple 
Fields that the wholesale market for apples was the 
appropriate market definition for the case. 
(6) 
The Apple and Pear Marketing Act gives the Board legal 
monopsony and monopoly powers. The question then is how far 
a Statutory Board may go in the use of that power? The 
Board approached this matter by claiming that the APMB Act 
prevented workable competition so that, by implication, the 
Board does not have to act in a competitive fashion, 
(Bollard, para 95). 
Apple Field's attacked the TCC proposal by showing that in 
being forced to buy TCC's when existing firms did not, TCC's 
were a barrier to the entry of new firms to the market. 
They added to long run marginal costs of production since 
each carton of output had to meet the interest cost of a TCC 
so that the left shift in the supply curve constituted a 
restriction in supply. Though a firm could buy them on the 
open market, doing so would result in a vertical supply 
curve of apples. This is because an orchard would buy them 
on the open market when their market price was below their 
price from the Board. In that case no new TCCs would result 
so industry output would be constrained to the initial level 
of TCCs. In the case where the market price of TCCs was 
below the Board's selling price the TCCs would be a quota on 
the industry's production. It was also pointed out that 
TCCs would not add to the wealth of existing growers who did 
not have to pay for them. The reason for this is that the 
capital value of an orchard which does not pay for TCCs is 
fixed by the present value of the profit stream. So in 
selling an orchard the value of trees, the assets specific 
to orcharding, falls by the market value of the TCC's. 
Apple Fields argued that the TCC scheme was an attempt at 
uncompetitive rent seeking by the existing members of Fruit-
Fed to allow them to benefit at the expense of new entrants 
to the industry. 
The Board denied the validity of the above arguments at 
various points in Bollard's evidence. The High Court's 
decision was to strike down the TCC proposal as a violation 
of the Apple and Pear Marketing Act rather than of the 
Commerce Act. The reason was that it is not a part of the 
Board's function to create assets in the hands of growers 
(Holland, Judgement p28). The judgement found that the TCC 
proposal was a rent seeking device (Holland Judgement p42). 
The Judge went on, however, very specifically to say that 
the Apple and Pear Marketing Act is subject to the 
provisions of the Commerce Act (Holland, Judgement p41). In 
effect, the ruling means that the statutory producer boards 
are subject to the pro-competitive Commerce Act. 
Apple Fields' contention that there was a restriction of 
supply failed (in the High Court) because the Commerce Act 
requires proof that, whatever the effects, the 2urpQ§e of 
the arrangement is to restrict supply. It was found that 
the Board occupies a dominant position in the apple market 
but again the purpose behind its actions was not to restrict 
supply. (Holland, Judgement p42,43,44). Apple Fields were 
(7 ) 
awarded costs and damages against the Board. 
decisions were not appealed by the Board. 
These 
"Purpose" was re-examined in the Court of Appeal. With 
respect to the second tier levies, the Board's position was 
that all output would not be charged the same price for 
storage in a competitive market mainly for th~ obscure 
reasons that storage is not a constant cost process nor a 
perfectly competitive industry, (Bollard, p39). Apple 
Field's argued that the 2TL was a barrier to entry and that 
it restricted supply. It was also claimed to be an 
uncompetitive and discriminatory charge on new output. In a 
competitive market all output would pay the same price for 
equivalent storage. 
The High Court ruled that 
Commerce Act but the Board 
the Court of Appeal. 
7. COURT OF APPEAL 
the 
took 
2TL was a breach of the 
this aspect of the case to 
Justice Cooke in the majority judgement from the Court of 
Appeal considered the matter of purpose~ It will be recalled 
that it had not been shown to the High Court's satisfaction 
that the purpose was to restrict supply. Cooke noted that 
the High Court had concluded that 
" ... the Board's purpose was not to restrict 
entry or deter competitive conduct in the 
market, but to recover from those entering the 
market or increasing production a fair 
proportion of the capital costs created by such 
entry or increase." (Cooke, J. p8) 
In a telling passage Justice Cooke wrote that entry 
deterrence and cost recovery and supply restriction were one 
and the same thing, viz; 
"The difficulty, as I see it is, that those two 
ways of analyzing the Board's purpose are not 
really different. They are in contrast but 
alternative ways of saying the same thing. The 
Board had set out to ensure that newcomers would 
not be attracted to the industry partly by the 
prospect of establishment cost seen by the Board 
as unrealistically low. Similarly the Board 
thought that established growers would be less 
likely to make new plantings if faced with a 
levy." (Cooke, J. p9) 
( 8 ) 
" I cannot avoid the conclusion that the 
arrangement for the levy between the Board and 
the Federation, however well motivated, has had 
the substantial purpose of deterring entry into 
the apple-growing industry of increasing 
production." (Cooke, J. p9) 
It would seem, though it is not explicitly stated, that the 
Court of Appeal accepted the economic analysis advanced by 
Apple Fields. In any event, that Court determ~ned that the 
actions of the Board were uncompetitive and in that sense a 
violation of some sections of the Commerce Act. 
The minority Appeal Court judgement of Justice Richardson 
still has authority in lower courts. He made the point that 
"Public regulation is provided for because of 
dissatisfaction with market results. Those laws are part of 
the legal framework within which competition law is to 
operate." (Richardson p3). He quotes p128 from Areeda and 
Kaplow: 
"The relation of regulatory policies to the 
antitrust laws will vary from industry to 
industry~ the tighter the regulatory control, 
the less room there is for antitrust policy." 
Justice Richardson repeated the view, which has not received 
objective verification, 
" that it is in the public interest to 
provide an orderly marketing system under the 
control of the Apple and Pear Marketing Board." 
In essence Richardson (p4) argues that the APMB Act places 
the Board beyond the reach of the Commerce Act in many 
respects. For example, he (p8) concludes that the Board's 
price fixing authority is intended to allow the Board to use 
its monopsonistic power. Accordingly, 
"Accountability is thus seen to exist not 
through the ordinary process of market 
competition and contestability for the sale and 
purchase of apples and pears in New Zealand, but 
through two means." (Richardson p8) 
The first method is by the consultative process between 
Fruit-Fed and the Board which is enshrined in the extremely 
detailed legislation on consultation. The second is by the 
function of the Auditor General who audits the Board's 
accounts. The first constraint is problematic since the 
voting power in Fruit-Fed and the Board lies with existing 
growers. New entrants being small in number have negligible 
voting power. In any event they were seen by the High Court 
as being the target of rent seeking by existing growers. 
The second constraint is really a constraint on accounting 
(9 ) 
practices as the Auditor-General is not generally regarded 
to be competent in economic affairs which lie at the heart 
of this issue. 
8. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE COMMERCE ACT 
The Commerce Act contains exception clauses (Sections 43-45) 
which release certain activities from the application of the 
Act. Richardson cited an intention of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act, 1974 upon which" the (New Zealand) 
Commerce Act 1986 was substantially based." (Richardson 
p16) . The Australians had specifically exempted their 
producer boards from their Trade Practices Act. A 1980 New 
Zealand case involving the Wool Board had allowed an 
exclusive, and therefore uncompetitive, shipping arrangement 
that was explicit in the Wool Board's empowering act (ABC 
Container Line v New Zealand Wool Board [1980] 1 NZLR 372). 
In Richardson's view the legislators intended that the 
Producer Boards should come within the ambit of the 
exemptions clauses of Section 43 of the Commerce Act. The 
issue then for the whole Court became one of whether the 
uncompetitive levy system met the Section 43 criteria for 
exemption from the Commerce Act. This is an important point 
of antitrust law, viz which activities are to be outside the 
application of the Commerce Act? 
"In all the circumstances it seems to me that we 
have to interpret and apply S43 of the New 
Zealand Act largely unaided in principle by 
prior cases." (Cooke, p15) 
Exemptions from the Commerce Act can arise only from Acts of 
Parliament. If a statute grants what is called a specific 
authority to undertake some activity, that will be protected 
from attacks which use the Commerce Act. But a general 
authority in a statute is not so protected. 
The legislation does have to be fairly precise for an 
activity to be sheltered by Section 43 of the Commerce Act. 
"If the terms of the authorising enactmment 
leave no doubt that anti-competitive measures 
were in contemplation, it will fall within the 
exception to the general regime of the Commerce 
Act intended to preserve competition." 
(Cooke, p15) 
Section 31 of the Apple and Pear Board Marketing Act, 1986 
is as follows: 
31. Levies. The Board, with the approval of 
the Fruitgrowers' Federation ... , may impose on 
growers levies of such nature and incidence as 
the Board thinks fit. 
(10) 
The language of S31 is precise. It would seem that the 
coverage of S31 is very broad, allowing any and all types of 
levies, and that it is therefore a general provision and not 
of the specific type required to qualify for protection from 
the Commerce Act. For example, even a charge on a single 
grower could be allowed under S31. To put the point in 
another way, how could S31 be altered to expand the types of 
charges the Board may impose? No charge is excluded by S31 
so it would seem to be a general provision for charges. The 
Board could apparently impose levies on the basis of area, 
number of employees or profits. 
It was ruled by the Appeal Court that S31 is not a general 
provision, that it is specific and does specifically allow 
the Board to impose levies which discriminate between 
growers, in this case between new production and old. "Such 
a policy will inevitably or is highly likely to lessen 
competition." (Cooke p16) Nevertheless, the act 
establishing the producer board overrides the Commerce Act 
on this point though not in general. In the end the Court of 
Appeal preferred the laws of the land to the laws of 
economics. 
What the Court of Appeal appears to have implicitly done is 
focus upon levies as charges related to production instead 
of interpreting "levy" as synonymous with "charge". The 
phrase "of such nature ... as the Board thinks fit" in S31 
allows charges of any description. S31 allows a general 
category of charges. The Court has therefore, in our 
opinion, erred in deciding that the section is specific when 
it should have concluded that it was general and therefore 
not sheltered from the Commerce Act. 
9. REVISION OF THE MARKETING ACT 
Justice Holland (p44) has called for a revision of the Apple 
and Pear Marketing Act requesting clarification of its 
relation to the Commerce Act. This is surely overdue given 
the changes in thinking about government regulation that 
have occurred. Other industries would find the degree of 
supervision exercised by the Apple and Pear Board costly. 
Perhaps one reason the level of intervention has been 
sustained for 41 years is because of the simplicity of the 
product. Less processing of apples occurs than of most 
commodities so that regulations, while costly, are less 
costly to conform to than they would be with more complex 
commodities. Consequently, the resistance to controls is 
greater in those other industries. 
Justice Richardson, in his views summarised above stated 
that the aim of regulation is to serve the public interest. 
He did not discuss the rent seeking nature of regulation. 
Advances in the public interest, a slippery concept in 
itself, are not likely to occur when rent seekers are 
(11) 
developing the regulations. The High Court recognised rent 
seeking in its discussion of TCCs. 
The question to be addressed here, if the act is to be 
revised, is "What commercial purpose does the Apple and Pear 
Board serve that the market could not do more cheaply?" 
There is a received wisdom on the usefulness of the Board 
which has achieved acceptance in New Zealand more through 
reiteration of the view than by objective demonstrations of 
it. 
The New Zealand apple crop is less than five percent of 
world trade in apples so the amount of long run world market 
power which the Board has is likely to be minimal. Other 
producer boards in New Zealand do not always have the 
compulsory acquisition rights, import and export monopolies 
and the other privileges enjoyed by the Board. The Dairy 
Board, does not have monopoly import rights for dairy 
products. One thing that the market might not do cheaply is' 
to collect and disseminate information. 
One. transitional problem may emerge if the Board's 
privileges were to be withdrawn. There may be difficulties 
short term in establishing export outlets, storage, 
transport and shipping facilities. These difficulties 
should not be overstated because the existing providers of 
them would still have a profit incentive to continue doing 
so. The reorganised Board could for example continue its 
role in these areas with a basis in cost effectiveness 
rather than in legislative compulsion. Cheaper providers of 
the services would have the opportunity to establish 
themselves in competition with the Board whose activities 
would shrivel in an efficient way. 
10. CER IMPLICATIONS 
New Zealand has a common market agreement called CER with 
Australia. There are mutual tariff concessions (though not 
a common external tariff), complete factor mobility, some 
harmonisation of commercial law and the New Zealand Prime 
Minister has raised the possibility of a common currency. 
Rationalisation of industries has occurred within the common 
market and is continuing. These arrangements have developed 
over the past twenty years. They will cause difficulties 
for the apple marketing boards in each country in a number 
of respects. New Zealand agricultural industries operate 
with virtually no protection or direct assistance from the 
government. This is not the case in Australia. In dairy 
products the problem was resolved with a tacit agreement 
between the Dairy Boards in each country not to compete in 
each other's markets. 
CER covers horticultural products and significant quantities 
of Australian fruit enters New Zealand, though no apples, 
(12) 
because apple imports are controlled by the New Zealand 
Board. This seems to be a direct violation of the CER 
agreements. The CER agreements appear to allow firms in 
each country to export freely to the other on their own 
account, i.e. not through producer boards where they exist. 
There thus appears to be another conflict between 
regulations which is further complicated in law since the 
Australian producer boards are exempt from Australian Trade 
Practice legislation while the New Zealand Boards are 
subject to the Commerce Act. CER could be seen as a breach 
of the monopol~stic/monopsonistic power. of the New Zealand 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board. An Australian firm, not 
necessarily in the apple industry could use the CER 
agreement, it would seem, to buy apples in New Zealand and 
sell them where it will. A New Zealand grower could own the 
Australian company and bypass the straight jacket of the New 
Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Act whether it is revised 
or not. 
11. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
It is clear that the second tier levy imposes cost 
distortions on the industry and social costs on the nation 
in the form of reduced supply and exports. This is true 
from an economic perspective in spite of the fact that it 
appears to be legal to differentially levy producers. 
Transferable crop certificates could have the same effect 
and certainly would not result in social or industry 
benefits. 
This economic conclusion rests on two propositions. First 
that the long run elasticity of export demand for apples 
facing New Zealand is nearly infinite. Given New Zealand's 
world market share, the elasticity is highly likely to be of 
that order. If the elasticity is finite in the long run, 
then an export tax of some form might be optimal. However 
differential levies or TCC's are not a first best export tax 
and more efficient means are avai1able to the Board to 
exploit such gains where they exist. The second proposition 
is that in a small country, the theory of the second best 
apart, a Paretian improvement in welfare would result from a 
competitive wholesale market for apples - one which does not 
discriminate between old and new growers. That is, when the 
marketing board does not use its monopsonistic market 
powers. 
The storage financing issue might easily be overcome by the 
Board withdrawing from the ownership of new storage 
facilities or charging competitive storage prices in 
traditional areas. Storage could be left to the private 
sector. Growers in new or expanding regions could then be 
made responsible for financing new facilities directly or 
indirectly. 
(13) 
Why hasn't the Board chosen to withdraw from the storage 
business? One possible reason is that if new large 
corporate growers provided their own storage facilities, the 
"value" of the Board structure might be seen to be lessened 
in some way. Another way to view this is that perhaps the 
Board believes its support is derived from the ownership of 
storage assets as well as its control of standards, shipping 
and marketing. Such beliefs might be important as the 
economic union (ANZCERTA Agreement) between Australia and 
New Zealand develops. Increasingly it might be argued that 
Australasia is a common market and that Australia is not a 
foreign market for the legal interpretation of monopoly 
export powers. 
The conflict over levies might be resolved if the APMB Act 
was amended to specify Board asset ownership directly to 
particular growers. However, this change might raise an 
additional set of legal and equity concerns. From a 
political point of view, how could the state justify 
relinquishing ownership of a State organisation to private 
individuals without going through a sale process? 
Furthermore, if the Board was to be converted to an 
essentially privately owned body, it might prove difficult 
to justify the continuance of the powers currently specified 
in the APMB Act itself. In short, a change of ownership 
might also require rescinding the APMB Act. 
There are a wide range of speculative possibilities. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that marketing 
boards have wide powers that potentially can be used to 
advance an industry or to retard it. ,The courts in New 
Zealand have ruled that general anti-trust legislation 
cannot always be used as a check on the implementation of 
such powers. 
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